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Attachment to

TS-76354

Gr # of

Approved For Release 2000/08/03 : CIA-RDP62-01094R000100060018-3

Response by Assistant Director, Current Intelligence  
to  
Inspector General Report, 21 March 1955  
III Discussion (page 7, ref., 25 of Recommendations, page 6)

A. 1. a. & b. Concur in desirability of restatement of OCI's Mission and Functions.

A.1. c. Concur with respect to Mission and Functions of Current Intelligence.

A. 2. a.-d. is a restatement of Recommendations II. 2. (a) through (g) somewhat expanded and includes certain statements which are not accepted.

If required, a brief on any particular point will be furnished.

A. 2. e. and f. No comment.

A. 3. a. No comment.

A. 3. b. Reference is presumed to be to "Dawn Watchpot". For response see II. 9.

A. 4. a. No comment.

A. 4. b. and c. Concur in recommendation. In process.

A. 4. d. No comment.

A. 4. e. It is recognized that there were some analysts who did not favor the merger of Indications Staff with the Soviet Division to form the new Soviet Staff and who opposed the abolition of the Situation Summary which had been the Indication Staff's publication. It is my considered judgment from experience that the realignment increased our capability and improved our performance in indications intelligence, which continues to receive the highest priority and attention in the office.

A. 4. f. The recommendation is noted and is under consideration for action.

A. 5. a.-1. Response in separate paper.

B. 1. a. and b. No comment.

B. 2. a. No comment

~~TOP SECRET~~

- B. 2. b. Concur when time and circumstances permit.
- B. 2. c. The office is also unable to assess the value of such briefings overall; limitation to a fruitful minimum is naturally desired.
- B. 2. d. and e. The Situation Room briefing program is admittedly a problem, although not a serious one in my opinion. In order to be prepared for times of crisis, when the Situation Room becomes a focal point of interest, it is necessary to maintain a minimum of routine during periods of relative calm. I therefore oppose the discontinuance of Situation Room briefings. Instead I propose to re-examine the present briefing program to make sure that is at the minimum level required.
- B. 2. f. No comment except to note that all "professional briefings" require assistance by the OCI area divisions.
- B. 3. See response to Recommendation II. 8.
- B. 4. See response to Recommendation II. 9.
- B. 5. See response to Recommendation II. 10.
- B. 6. See response to Recommendation II. 11.
- B. 7. The IG has pointed to a live issue which is currently under DD/I re-review. We are under DD/I instruction to come up with recommendations for a solution more acceptable than the present one as represented by the OCI weekly memorandum on Soviet-Communist Propaganda Highlights.
- B. 8. See response to Recommendation II. 12.
- B. 9. See response to Recommendation II. 13.
- B. 10. See response to Recommendation II. 14.
- C. 1.-8. No comment at this time.
- D. 1.a. No comment.
- D. 1. b. The IG's statements are noted. It is my belief that the office has made considerable progress, in particular by negotiations on an individual basis.

TOP SECRET

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D. 1. c. Concur.

D. 1. d. and e. Concur.

D. 2. Responses to II, 16, 17, 18 apply.

D. 3. Response to II. 19 applies.

D. 4. Response to II. 20 applies.

D. 5. The IG's observations on OCI's relations with other offices have been noted and are under review for corrective action wherever possible.

E. 1. 5. Aspects of recommended separation of COMINT responsibility are treated in separate response.

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TOP SECRET